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STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
MICHAEL CKUGG,

Civil No, 870308-CA

Defendant/Respondent.

REPLY OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction herein conferred upon
Rule 3(a)

and Rule

4(a) of

the Court

of Appeals by

the Rules of Utah Court of Appeals,

Article VIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution and Section 784-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT SHOWING THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This

is

an

appeal

from

the

judgment

rendered

by

the

Honorable David W, Sorenson of the Second Circuit Court of the
State of Utah, for Cache County,
was held

regarding the

the defendant's motion
completed its

case was

Logan City

Department. A trial

above-stated matter on July 6, 1987, and
for

dismissal

after

granted by the Court.

the

appellant had

The defendant was

tried for being in physical control of a motor vehicle in

violation of Section
amended.

On

the

41-6-44(1)
6th

day

of

Utah

Code

Annotated

1953, as

July, 1987, the above case was

presented to the judge without a jury.

Appellant seeks reversal

of the Circuit Court's decision.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
The

appellant

responds

to

the

issues

stated

by

the

respondent in response:
1.

That there

reasonable doubt

was sufficient

that the

evidence to

defendant was

prove beyond a

driving or operating a

vehicle upon the highways of the State of Utah.
2.

That there

reasonable

doubt

was sufficient

that

the

evidence to

defendant

was

in

prove beyond a
actual physical

control as required by statute.
3.

That there

was sufficient

evidence to

prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was under the influence so as
to be incapable of operating a vehicle safely.
4.

That there

was sufficient

evidence to

prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant did fall within the exception
of State of Utah v. Buggar, 483 P. 2d 442 (1971).
5.

That there was sufficient

delicti.

-2-

evidence to

establish corpus

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES

I.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44 (1953 as amended),

2o

Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-11 (1953 as amended).

3.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(1).

4.

Lopez v. Schwendimanr 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986).

5.

Schwendiman v. Garcia, 645 P. 2d 651.

6.

State of Utah v. Buggar, 483 P.2d 442 (1971).

7.

State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982).

8.

State v. Tucker, 709 P. 2d 313 (Utah 1985).

9.

State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175 (Utah 1977).

10. People v. Garcia, 197 Cal.Rptr, 277 (1983).
II. Oregon v. Smith, 570 P.2d 409 (Or. 1977).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the early morning hours of June 5, 1987, Officer Joe Yonk
and Officer Spence Anderson were on routine patrol
Utah, area.

The

officers were

traveling westbound on the west

side of the Hyrum Dam when they observed
parked off

the shoulder

of the

in the Hyrum,

a yellow

Ford Maverick

road approximately two to three

feet (TR p. 5). The officers observed

an individual

behind the

wheel with his head leaning toward the window (TR p. 36).

The

officers

pulled

behind

and

to

the side of the Ford

Maverick and Officer Anderson, who was a passenger
vehicle, went

to the

Ford Maverick to check on the condition of

the driver (TR pp. 5, 37). The driver was
wheel,
officer

the

keys

noticed

awake and

behind the

were

in

the ignition of the vehicle, and the

signs

of

impairment

Respondent, Michael

Chugg, and

as

he

could smell

coming from his breath (TR pp. 5, 6,
officers also

in the patrol

12, 22,

talked

to

the

and odor of alcohol
23, 40,

44). The

noticed that the speech of the Respondent was slow

and not normal (TR p. 40). Officer Anderson had the suspect exit
the

vehicle

noticing

that

unstable (TR p. 40). The
patrol

car

where

the

the

suspect
officer

Respondent appeared to be very
moved

to

the

front

of the

proceeded to administer several

field sobriety tests (TR p. 6).
While
tests,

the

officer

Officer

Yonk

was

exited

administering

the

the

walked

vehicle,

suspect's vehicle, and observed the keys
44).

At

this

time

that of

over to the

ignition (TR p.

Officer Anderson requested the Respondent

perform three field sobriety
performed was

in the

field sobriety

tests (TR

p. 6).

The

first test

that horizontal gaze nystagmus (TR p. 7).

The officer explained this test to the Respondent (TR p. 8). The
officer

then

stated

smooth pursuit in

both

that
eyes

the Respondent's eyes lacked that of
and

deviation (TR p. 8).

-4-

his

eyes

jerked

at maximum

The next

test requested

was that of the walk and
explained

this

test

to be

turn

to

test

the

performed by the Respondent
(TR

p.

Respondent

9).

and

The officer

asked

him if he

understood it (TR p. 10). He replied that he did (TR pp. 8, 10).
The officer indicated that the Respondent was unable to place his
right foot in front of his left foot and to perform the
turn

test

(TR

pp.

9,

10).

walk and

The officer also stated that the

Respondent was very unstable on

his

feet

and

swayed

back and

forth as well as side to side (TR p. 10).
The third

field sobriety

test the Respondent was requested

to perform was that of the one leg stand and balance (TR

p. 10).

The officer demonstrated this test and asked the Respondent if he
understood it
11).

and the

Respondent responded

that he

did (TR p.

The officer observed that the Respondent could not lift his

foot off the ground for more than two
Respondent

tried

to

count,

keeping

seconds (TR
his

toes

p. 11).
on

The

the ground

contrary to the instructions given by the officer (TR p.11).
After the

field

Respondent
vehicle

sobriety

under

while

arrest

intoxicated

Section 41-6-44(1),

tests, officer
for

being

in

physical

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

placed the
control of a
Annotated,

(1953, as amended) (TR pp. 12, 13, 14). The

defendant told the officers that
occasions (TR

Anderson

pp. 16,

19, 20).

he
The

had

been

drinking

Respondent stated that he

thought he was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage
-5-

on two

according to the results of the

intoxilyzer test

results (TR p.

20).
Officer Joe

Yonk observed

two of

the field sobriety tests

that were being administered by Officer Anderson, the heel to toe
and

the

balance

test

(TR

pp.

37, 38).

testified that the Respondent was unable
(TR

p.

39).

Also

in

Respondent was obviously
influence of

intoxicated

an alcoholic

however,

at

intoxilyzer

(TR pp.
the
was

and

beverage (TR

14, 39,

time

of

Jail

40).

the

breath

trial,

unavailable

prepared.

sample

the

(TR

from

the

The Court indicated,

intoxilyzer

samples

had

either test

in

not

definitely

pp.

for

the

been

taking

of a

test was taken;

expert

witness

on the

49-50).

Also, the

time after

the taking

Respondent
its

under the

p. 39). The Respondent

The breath

intoxilyzer certificate for the period of
of

to perform

Court both officers testified that the

was transferred to the Cache County
breath test

Officer Yonk also

had

not yet been

findings,

that because

admitted

into

evidence,

indicating the blood alcohol, content that it could not find that
the Respondent was in physical control of a

vehicle while under

the influence of alcohol (TR pp.58, 59, 61).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The first issue of the Respondent is disposed of pursuant to Utah
Code

Annotated

according to

Section

Utah Code

41-6-ll(b)

(1953

as

amended),

and

Annotated Section 41-6-44 et al, in that

operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State of Utah
-6-

is not

an

condition

element
who

of

is

DUI.

unable

arrested under the

An

to

statutory

operator

operate

a

in

an intoxicated

vehicle safely may be

provisions

stated

supra anywhere

within the State of Utah.
As pertaining

to Issue

Two the

findings that the defendant was

in

Circuit Court found in its
actual

physical

control as

required by statute.
As

pertaining

to

Issue

Three

the

State would refer the

Honorable Court back to its argument in the appellant's brief.
The Court held as pertaining to

the respondents

Issue Four

that the defendant was in control of the motor vehicle.
Pursuant

to

Utah

Rules

of

Evidence, Rule 103(a)(1), and

according to case law, the Defendant may not bring up
on

appeal

court.

when

there

has

not

As pertaining the issue

new issues

been an objection in the lower

of corpus

delicti there

was no

objection made in the lower court.

However, the State would also

indicate that there

facie

establish

corpus

was
delicti

a

prima
in

bringing

showing

sufficient to

in the admission of the

defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED TO SHOW THAT THE VEHICLE WAS
BEING OPERATED UPON THE HIGHWAYS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PURSUANT TO SECTION 41-6-44, (1953 AS AMENDED).
The legislature has held in Utah Code Annotated

Section 41-

6-11(b) (1953 as amended) that in order for a jury or court to
-7-

find

a

Influence

defendant
section

guilty
of

of

the

violating

Codef

the

.Section

Driving Under the
41-6-44

Utah

Code

Annotated (1953, as amended), that the violation happened in the
State of Utah not

limiting

the

violation

to

public highways.

Section 41-6-11 the Utah Code states:
"The provisions
of this chapter relating to the
operation of vehicles
refer
exclusively
to the
operation of vehicles upon highways, except:
(1)
where a different place is specifically referred
to in a given section; or
(2) under the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5 and
Sections 41-6-29 to 41-6-45 inclusive, which apply upon
highways and elsewhere throughout the state."
Also under Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44(1)(a) (1953 as amended) it
reads:
"(l)(a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in
this section for any person to operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the
person has a blood or breath alcohol content of .08% or
greater by weight as shown by a chemical test given
within two hours after the alleged
operation or
physical control, or if the person is under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which
renders the person incapable of safely operating a
vehicle." (Emphasis Added).
Both sections

of Utah

operation

a

of

defendant has

Code Annotated

motor

vehicle

been charged

under

clearly indicate that the
the

Section

which

the

does not require that said operation

be upon the highways of the State of Utah.
POINT TOO
WAS THE RESPONDENT
REQUIRED BY STATUTE.

IN

ACTUAL

PHYSICAL

CONTROL

AS

The Honorable Judge Sorenson held that at this point in time
the defendant was driving the vehicle.
-8-

The court stated:

"If you look at Lopez and Garcia, and those particular
cases, I think our Supreme Court since Tuckett gave
this even his dissent — or not Tuckett, but Elliott,
gave his dissent in the Buggar case, the Supreme Court
has probably broadened what it had announced in Buggar.
But in this particular case, what the Court sees and
has heard, at least the testimony at this point in
time, there is no doubt that the defendant was driving
the vehicle. We have a contradiction of terms between
the officers as to actually what they observed or what
was when they came up to the case."
It is apparent from the decision
respondent

was

found

to

of

be

in

the

lower

court

control of the motor vehicle.

However, assuming for argument purposes the court is
hear and
the

discuss this

cases

which

it

specifically Lopez

issue on
cited

in

the

v. Schwendiman,

were presented

inclined to

appeal the State would refer to
Brief

of

to the

Appellant

more

720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986) and

Schwendiman v. Garcia 645 P.2d 651, those cases
facts that

that the

coupled with the

Court would indicate that the

defendant was in physical control of the motor

vehicle.

He was

behind the wheel, he was awake, and the keys were in the ignition
of the vehicle.
roadway.

The vehicle

The Utah

was parked

Supreme Court

expanded State of Utah v. Buggar,
controlling cases

because

side of the

and the Court of Appeals have
483 P.2d

442 (1971),

and the

relating to the fact as presented to the Court

would indicate that Buggar,
matter

along the

the

supra

defendant

is

was

not

not

controlling
asleep.

in this

However, the

appellant would also argue that the analysis in Buggar, supra, in
regards

to

physical

control

would

also substantiate that the

respondent should have been found and was found to be in physical
control of the motor vehicle.
-9-

POINT THREE
WAS IT IMPROPER TO USE THE
PROVE THE CORPUS DELICTI.
A review of the

transcript

DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION TO
indicates

that

the Respondent

never made an objection on the basis of corpus delicti or the use
of the
asked

defendant's admission
at

the

trial

counsel placed an

court

objection

at trial.

When

the question was

level neither the respondent or his
on

the

record

and

therefore, it

cannot now be raised for the first time on appeal.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

stated in State v. McCardell, 652

P. 2d 942 at 947 (Utah 1982):
"We endorse the following statement by the Kansas
Supreme Court in that case:
'The contemporaryness
objectional law adhered to in the State requires timely
and specific objections to admission of evidence on
order for the question
of
admissability
to be
considered upon appeal. The rule a salutary procedural
tool serving the legitimate state purpose.
By making
the use of the rule, counsel gives trial court the
opportunity to conduct a trial without using the
tainted evidence, and thus avoid possible reversal and
a new trial. Furthermore, the rule is practically one
of necessity if litigation is ever to be brought to an
end."
Also, in the case of State v. Tucker, 709 P. 2d

313 at

315 (Utah

1985), the Supreme Court stated:
"Under the contemporaneous objection rule, if the trial
court objection does not direct the court's attention
to a legal point being raised upon appeal, we cannot
consider it for the first time on appeal."
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(1), it states:
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless the substantial rights of
the party is effected, and
(1) Objection.
In case the ruling is one admitting
evidence, timely objection or motion to strike appears
-10-

of record stating the specific grounds of objection, if the
specific grounds v/as not apparent from the context: or..eff
It is apparent from a review of the record that
never made

as to corpus delicti*

However, assuming for argument

purposes the court is inclined to
would point

out that

hear the

the evidence

issue, the appellant

given by the two officers as

stated in the facts listed supra, indicate a
of the

an objection was

prima facie showing

elements of driving while impaired and that the admission

of the defendant is admissible based
Court heard.

The

upon the

appellant is only required to present a prima

facie showing before the statement of
against him

in a

evidence that the

court of law.

the defendant

may be used

See State v. Knoefler, 563 P. 2d

175 (Utah 1977), People v. Garcia, 197 Cal.Rptr. 277, (1983), and
Oregon v. Smith, 57- P. 2d 409 (Or. 1977).

CONCLUSION
The arguments

made by the respondent are frivolous and have

no merit in this appeal.
convicted

of

driving

By statute a person may be arrested and
under

the

influence

impaired anywhere in the State of Utah.
by the

court to

Two officers

their opinion

the

alcohol

The defendant

while

v/as found

be in physical control of the motor vehicle and

the facts according to the
same.

of

recent

case

law

also

indicate the

testified at court without rebuttal that in
respondent

intoxicating substance.

It

was

under

the

influence

of an

is also apparent that under the new

case law cited supra, and according to the facts that the

-11-

defendant was not asleep but awake and

Buggar, supra,

would not

be controlling.
The respondent

has failed to make an objection in the lower

court concerning the corpus delicti argument and should be barred
from making the argument in the Court of Appeals.
DATED this /?&

day of November, 198 7.
,r

R" Eurbank
Cache County Attorney.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby

certify that

I mailed

a true and correct copy of

the foregoing RESPONSE BRIEF to C. DeMont Judd, Attorney for
Defendant, at 2650 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401.
DATED t h i s

A)t

ep-

>j^S>
/?*&
day of S e p t e m b e r ,

1987

"R" BTJRBANK
Cache County Attorney
ey for the State of Utah
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720 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

consider whether and under what circumstances recusal may be required in administrative adjudications when the specific provisions of section 54-7-1.5 do not apply.
Plainly, having participated in a rule making proceeding does not automatically preclude a commissioner from participating in
a later, properly conducted adjudication.
We have considered the other issues
raised and find their disposition unnecessary to the result. The Commission's rule
is of no force and effect, and its order is
vacated. The matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

whose vehicles are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble, and (2) driver's refusal to submit to breath test upon
rumors that there had been incidents of
tampering with breathalyzer in the past
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting defendant to license revocation.
Affirmed.
1. Automobiles <3=>144.2(9)
In revocation proceeding, Driver Division has burden to show that operator of
vehicle was in actual physical control of
motor vehicle and that arresting officer
had grounds to believe that operator was
under influence of alcohol.
2. Automobiles <s=>144.2(10)
In trial de novo, district court must
determine by preponderance of evidence
whether driver's license was subject to revocation for driving under the influence of
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10.

Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Fred C. SCHWENDIMA*J, Chief, Driver
License Services, Utah Department of
Public Safety, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 20112.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 12, 1986.
Utah State Driver License Division revoked driving privileges of driver for period of one year. The Seventh District
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. Davidson, J., affirmed the administrative decision. Driver appealed. The Supreme
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
and/or drugs was intended by legislature
to protect public safety and apprehend
drunken driver before he or she strikes and
may not be construed to exclude those

3. Automobiles <3=>144.2(3)
Supreme Court's review of district
court's determination as to whether driver's license was subject to revocation for
driving while under the influence of alcohol
is deferential to trial court's view of evidence unless trial court has misapplied
principles of law or its findings are clearly
against weight of evidence.
4. Automobiles 0=^144.1(1)
Even if truck was inoperable at time
that licensee was found sleeping in it and
arrested, that would not preclude him from
having "actual physical control" over truck
so that his driver's license could be revoked
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alcohol content. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2).
5. Automobiles <3=>349
Statute providing for arrest of one "m
actual physical control" of vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs
was intended by legislature to protect public safety and apprehend drunken driver
before he or she strikes and may not be
construed to exclude those vehicles are
presently immobile because of mechanics

LOPEZ v. SCHWENDIMAN

Utah 779

Cite a* 720 p-** 778 (Utah 1986)

trouble. U.C.A.1953, 41-2-19.5, 41-6-44-"
10(2).
g. Automobiles <s=*144.2(10)
District court's findings that vehicle
had reached its point of rest under its oWn
power and that licensee had failed fiel^
sobriety test, were supported by competed
evidence, and would not be disturbed b v
Supreme Court.
7. Automobiles <$=>144.1(1)
Refusal to take breathalyzer test sirt1"
ply means that arrestee was asked to tak e
breath test decline to do so of his own
volition.
8. Automobiles <3=>144.2(8)
Whether or not driver's refusal to tak e
breath test is conditional or reasonab)e
makes no difference; result is still license
revocation of one year. U.C.A.1953, 41-6"
9. Automobiles ^144.1(1)
Refusal to answer yes or no to request
to taking breath test is still refusal, fo r
purpose of license revocation. U.C.A*
1953, 41-6-44.10.
10. Automobiles @=*144.1(1)
Driver's licensee admitted that he h-^
been requested to submit to breath te^
and that he had refused, invoking sanction
of revocation of his license. U.C.A. 195&
41-6-44.10.
11. Appeal and Error <3=»181
Supreme Court will not review allege^
Tor when no objection at all is made 0*
ial level.

ter a trial de novo, the trial court affirmed
the administrative decision. Lopez appeals
and contends: (1) it was error to find that
Lopez was in actual physical control of his
vehicle when he was asleep at the wheel
and the vehicle was inoperable; (2) his refusal to take a breath test was reasonable;
and (3) it was error to allow testimony on
Lopez's breath test refusal when Lopez did
not know that he was under arrest. We
affirm.
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on March 18,
1984, Officers Anderson and Schofield
were separately dispatched to investigate a
prowler report. En route, Schofield was
flagged down by an individual who pointed
to Lopez's truck parked by a public telephone booth adjacent to Sunnyside City
Hall. The truck's motor was not running.
There were vehicle tracks from the pickup
in the freshly fallen snow. When Schofield
approached the truck, Lopez was sitting in
the driver's seat with his head resting on
the steering wheel. Schofield tapped on
the window, assisted Lopez in opening the
door to talk to him, and had to catch him
when he fell more than stepped out of his
truck. Schofield smelled alcohol on Lopez's breath. Lopez was drooling, had
very poor balance, and needed support to
stand. When asked to produce a driver
license, Lopez initially handed the officer a
child's picture. Schofield removed the keys
from the ignition and had to turn them to
get them out.

After Officer Anderson arrived, both officers asked Lopez to perform several field
sobriety tests, which he failed. Lopez at
one point stated, "Was I driving, I was just
waiting for a phone call." Lopez was
Phil L. Hansen, (Lopez), Salt Lake City* placed under arrest, handcuffed, and
r plaintiff and a^jellaut.
jJiacea "m tne paYnft cur. l^otn oYncexs "tesDavid L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M- tified that Lopez asked several times what
Ale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for he was arrested for. Officer Anderson
efendant and respondent.
then requested Lopez to submit to a breath
test to determine the alcohol content in his
PER CURIAM:
blood. Lopez responded, "I took your
The Utah State Driver License Division tests. I passed your tests." Lopez was
evoked the driving privileges of petition^1* transported to the sheriffs station, where
°pez for a period of one year pursuant to he was again asked to submit to the breath
•C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.10 (1981 ed.). Af- test, was advised that he would be permit-

780

Utah

720 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

ted to have an additional test administered
by a physician of his own choice, and was
warned that his refusal to submit to the
test could result in revocation of his license
for one year. Lopez did not respond.
At trial, Lopez stated for the first time
that his wife had been driving the truck
when the battery died. He had been waiting in the truck for her to bring the car to
tow the truck home. He admitted that he
had not told the officers about any dead
battery or dead car. He admitted that he
understood that he had been arrested for
driving while under the influence. Lopez
also testified that he had refused the officer's request to take the breath test because he "didn't trust them" and that he
had conducted the field sobriety tests well
enough to prove that he had not been
drinking. He also confirmed that he had
been told that he would lose his license if
he refused.
From the evidence so adduced, the trial
court found by a preponderance that there
was probable cause to arrest Lopez, that he
had been requested to take the breath test,
and that he had been warned of the consequences if there was a refusal. The court
found the arrest proper because Lopez was
alone in the car, had the keys to the vehicle, "there were tire tracks leading up to
the vehicle, the vehicle got there apparently on its own power," and Lopez had failed
the field sobriety tests.
[1-3] In a revocation proceeding, the
Driver License Division has the burden to
show that the operator of a vehicle was "in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle"
and that the arresting officer had grounds
to believe that the operator was then under
the influence of alcohol.
Garcia v.
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah
1982); Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302
(Utah 1979). In a trial de novo, the district
court must determine by a preponderance
of the evidence "whether the petitioner's
license is subject to revocation under the
provisions of this chapter." § 41-6-44.10(2), supra; Garcia, 645 P.2d at 652. Our
review of that determination is deferential
to the trial court's view of the evidence

unless the trial court has misapplied principles of law or its findings are clearly
against the weight of the evidence. Id a ^
653.
Lopez first argues that the Driver License Division failed to meet the statutory
requirements that he had "actual physical
control" of the vehicle when he was arrested. Section 41-6-44.10(1) reads in pertinent part:
Any person operating a motor vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given
his consent to a chemical test or tests of
his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining whether he was driving or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or
while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or combination of alcohol and any
drug . . . so long as the test is or tests
are administered at the direction of a
peace officer having grounds to believe
that person to have been driving or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug
Lopez compares his situation to the facts
of State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483
P.2d 442 (1971), where the driver of the
vehicle had parked his car completely off
the road, had turned off the motor, and
was sleeping. Nothing in that case indicates that the driver was in the driver's
seat at the time he was found and arrested.
"Positioning in the driver's seat is an element common to all of the cases that have
found actual physical control of a motionless vehicle." State v. Smelter, 36 Wash.
App. 439, 674 P.2d 690 (1984). See also
Adams v. State, 697 P.2d 622 (Wyo.1985);
Huges v. State, 535 P.2d 1023 (Okla.Crim.
1975); but compare Bearden v. State, 430
P.2d 844 (Okla.Crim.1967), where the driver
lay unconscious on the ground beside his
pickup truck. The courts upholding convictions in these and similar fact situations
start out from the premise that as long as
a person is physically able to assert domin-

LOPEZ v. SCHWENDIMAN

Utah

781

Cite a* 720 P^d 778 (Utah 1986)

ion by starting the car and driving away,
he has substantially as much control over
the vehicle as he would if he were actually
driving it. Adams v. State, 697 P.2d at
625.
[4,5] Nonetheless, Lopez claims that
his car was inoperable at the time of his
arrest and that the statutory burden was
therefore not borne by the Driver License
Division as he was unable to start the car
and drive it away. We note initially that
Lopez first told this version of the events
leading to his arrest when he took the
stand in his trial de novo. No substantiating evidence was offered to buttress his
assertion. Under the circumstances, the
trial court may well have disbelieved him
and given little weight to his testimony.
Assuming arguendo that Lopez's truck
was indeed disabled, jurisdictions with similar statutes as ours have nonetheless
found "actual physical control" of the driver over the disabled car. The rationale was
forcefully voiced in State v. Smelter, 674
P.2d at 693:
The focus should not be narrowly upon
the mechanical condition of the car when
it comes to rest, but upon the status of
its occupant and the nature of the authority he or she exerted over the vehicle
in arriving at the place from which, by
virtue of its inoperability, it can no longer move. Where, as here, circumstantial
evidence permits a legitimate inference
that the car was where it was and was
performing as it was because of the defendant's choice, it follows that the defendant was in actual physical control.
To hold otherwise could conceivably allow an intoxicated driver whose vehicle
was rendered inoperable in a collision to
escape prosecution.
Citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 237 Pa.
Super.212, 352 A.2d 137 (1975). Utah's
statute provides for the arrest of one "in
actual physical control" of the vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol and/or
d
™gs. That requirement was intended by
°ur legislature to protect public safety and
apprehend the drunken driver before he or
she strikes, § 41-2-19.5; Garcia, 645 P.2d

at 654; accord Ballard v. State, supra,
and may not be construed to exclude those
whose vehicles are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble. State v.
Smelter, supra.
[6] The trial court here found that
there were tire tracks leading up to the
vehicle, that the vehicle had to have
reached its point of rest "apparently on its
own power," and that Lopez had failed the
field sobriety tests. Those findings are
supported by competent evidence and will
not be disturbed by this Court.
[7-10] At trial, Lopez based his refusal
to submit to a breath test upon the rumors
that there had been incidents of tampering
with the breathalyzer in the past. His
retort to the officers at the scene was that
he had taken the tests and passed them. A
refusal simply means that an arrestee who
is asked to take a breath test "declines to
do so of his own volition." Cavaness v.
Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979). Whether or
not that refusal is conditional makes no
difference. Id. Likewise, it makes no difference whether or not a refusal is reasonable. The result is still a license revocation
of one year. By the same token, a refusal
to answer yes or no to a request to take a
breath test is still a refusal. Beck v. Cox,
597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979). Lopez admitted
that he had been requested to submit to the
test and that he had refused. No more
was required to invoke the sanction of the
statute. § 41-6-44.10(2), supra.
[11] We do not reach the merits of Lopez's claim that testimony on his refusal to
take the breath test was inadmissible because he was not aware that he was under
arrest. Lopez's counsel did not object, but
actively solicited that testimony from Lopez on cross-examination. This Court will
not review alleged error when no objection
at all is made at the trial level. State v.
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983).
The judgment is affirmed.
! KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >
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den. In that case, however, the trial court
dismissed the robbery charge on its own
volition. That is not the case here.
The District Attorney's office, an arm
of the state, and under the direct supervision of the Attorney General (67-5-1),
that is appealing here,—a somewhat unorthodox and inconsistent circumstance,—
made the motion to dismiss the action,
which at that point was as much an issue
as Combs* restraint of liberty. It would
seem that before this court orders the
trial court to do much of anything the
matter of that motion to dismiss and the
resulting dismissal, all for a presumably
good cause, should be resolved.
In addition to the position I take on the
aspect of this case reflected in the paragraph immediately above, I urge that perhaps we made a mistake in the remand
portion of the McGuffey case and that we
should overrule that part of it. The instant case itself seems to point up the advisability of so doing. To do anything
more could lead us on safari in a civil
proceeding down a road into an erstwhile
juristic jungle of no return.

(o
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25 Utah 2d 404
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Charles BUGGER, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12278.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 6, 1971.

Defendant was convicted in the Second
District Court, Davis County, Thornley K.
Swan, J., of being in actual physical control of his vehicle while under influence
of intoxicating liquor, and he appealed.
The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that
defendant who was asleep in his automobile which was completely off traveled por-

tion of highway and whose motor was not
running at time investigating
officer
awakened defendant and detected smell of
alcohol was not in "actual physical control
of any vehicle" in violation of statute
proscribing such behavior at time of his
arrest.
Reversed.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Automobiles <§=>332

Defendant who was asleep in his automobile which was completely off traveled
portion of highway and whose motor was
not running at time investigating officer
awakened defendant and detected smell of
alcohol was not in "actual physical control
of any vehicle'* in violation of statute
proscribing such behavior at time of his
arrest. U.C.A.19S3, 41-6-44.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Robert Van Sciver, Van Sciver, Florence, Hutchison & Sharp, Salt Lake City,
for defendant-appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren
N. Beasley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff-respondent.
T U C K E T T , JusticeThe defendant was found guilty of a
violation of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A.1953,
and from that conviction he has appealed
to this court.
During the night of July 28, 1969, the
defendant was asleep in his automobile
which was parked upon the shoulder of a
road known as Tippet's Lane in Davis
County. The automobile was completely
off the traveled portion of the highway
and the motor was not running. An officer
of the Highway Patrol stopped at the scene
and discovered the defendant was asleep.
With some effort the officer succeeded in
awakening the defendant, at which time the
officer detected the smell of alcohol and
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arrested the defendant for being in actual
physical control of the vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The complaint charges the defendant
with the violation of the statute above referred to which provides as follows:
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in subsection (d) of this section
for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be
in actual physical control of any vehicle
within this state.
The defendant is here challenging the
validity of the statute on the grounds of
vagueness. However, we need not decide
the case upon that ground. That part of
the statute which states: "be in actual physical control of any vehicle" has been before the courts of other jurisdictions which
have statutes with similar wordings. The
word "actual" has been defined as meaning "existing in act or reality; * * * in
action or existence at the time being;
present; * * *." The word "physical"
is defined as "bodily," and "control" is defined as "to exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate; regulate;
hence, to hold from actions; to curb."
The term in "actual physical control" in
its ordinary sense means "existing" or
"present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation." l It is
clear that in the record before us the facts
do not bring the case within the wording
of the statute. The defendant at the time
of his arrest was not controlling the vehicle, nor was he exercising any dominion
over it. It is noted that the cases cited by
the plaintiff in support of its position in
this matter deal with entirely different fact
situations, such as the case where the driver
was seated in his vehicle on the traveled
portion of the highway; or where the motor of the vehicle was operating;, or where
the driver was attempting to steer the automobile while it was in motion; or where
I. State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d
338; State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243,
321 P.2d 615; Ohio v. Wilgus, Com.Pl.,

he was attempting to brake the vehicle to
arrest its motion.
We are of the opinion that the facts in
this case do not make out a violation of
the statute and the defendant's conviction
is reversed. We do not consider it necessary to discuss the other claimed errors
raised by the defendant.
CALLISTER, C. J., and H E N R I O D
and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
E L L E T T , Justice (dissenting).
I dissent.
The statute formerly made it unlawful
for a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive any vehicle upon any
highway within this state. 1 The amendment
added a provision making it unlawful to
be in actual physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. It removed the need to be upon a
highway before the crime was made out
and did away with the necessity of driving
before a crime was committed.
The reason for the change is obvious.
It is better to prevent an intoxicated person
in charge of an automobile from getting
on the highway than it is to punish him
after he gets on it. The amended statute
gives officers a right to arrest a drunk
person in the control of an automobile and
thus prevent him from wreaking havoc
a minute later by getting in traffic, or from
injuring himself by his erratic driving.
It does not matter whether the motor
is running or is idle nor whether the drunk
is in the front seat or in the back seat.
His potentiality for harm is lessened but
not obviated by a silent motor or a backseat position—provided, of course, that he
is the one in control of the car. It only
takes a flick of the wrist to start the motor
or to engage the gears, and it requires only
a moment of time to get under the wheel
from the back seat. A drunk in control
17 Ohio Supp. 34; Parker v. State (Okl.
Cr.App.), 424 P.2d 997; 47 A.L.R.2d 582.
I. Sec. 57-7-14, R.S.U.1933.
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of a motor vehicle has such a propensity
to cause harm that the statute intended to
make it criminal for him to be in a position
to do so.
Restraining the movement of a vehicle
is controlling it as much as moving it is.
A person finding a drunk in the back seat
of a car parked in one's driveway is likely
to learn who is in control of that car if
he should attempt to move it. A drunk
may maliciously block one's exit, and in
doing so he is in control of his own vehicle.
I think the defendant in this case was in
control of his truck within the meaning of
the statute even though he may have been
asleep. He had the key and was the only
one who could drive it. The fact that he
chose to park it is no reason to say he was
not in control thereof.
I, therefore, think that we should consider the question which he raises in his
brief as to the validity of the statute.
Cases wherein an attack was made on
statutes like ours have been decided in a
number of jurisdictions. They hold the
statute good.
In the case of State v. Webb, 78 Ariz.
8, 274 P.2d 338 (1954), the defendant was
intoxicated and asleep in a truck parked
next to some barricades in a lane of traffic. An officer passed by and observed
no one in the car. Later he returned and
found the defendant "passed out." The
statute made it a crime to be in actual
physical control of a car while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. The defendant contended that the wording of the
statute was not meant to apply to a situation where the car was parked and that it
was only concerned with the driving of an
automobile and other acts and conduct of a
positive nature. In holding that the statute
was applicable to the conduct of the defendant, the court said:
An intoxicated person seated behind
the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is
a threat to the safety and welfare of
the public. The danger is less than that
involved when the vehicle is actually
moving, but it does exist.

In the case of Parker v. State, 424 P.2d
997 (Okl.Cr.App.1967), the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a statute
making it unlawful for "any person who is
under the influence of intoxicating liquor
to drive, operate, or be in actual physical
control of any motor vehicle within this
state." There the defendant (appellant)
claimed that the statute was unconstitutional in that it was so vague and indefinite
that a person charged thereunder would be
deprived of due process of law. The court
held that the statute did not violate any
of appellant's constitutional rights.
Under a similar statute the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Ruona, 133 Mont.
243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958), held that the
statute was not void for vagueness, and in
doing so said:
* * * Thus one could have "actual
physical control" while merely parking
or standing still so long as one was
keeping the car in restraint or in position to regulate its movements. Preventing a car from moving is as much control
and dominion as actually putting the car
in motion on the highway. Could one
exercise any more regulation over a
thing, while bodily present, than prevention of movement or curbing movement.
As long as one were physically or bodily
able to assert dominion, in the sense of
movement, then he has as much control
over an object as he would if he were
actually driving the vehicle.
*

*

*

*

*

*

* * * [I]t is quite evident that the
statute in the instant case is neither
vague nor uncertain. * * *
The appellant here claims some federally
protected rights in that he says he was improperly arrested. It is difficult for me to
see where that has anything to do with
guilt or innocence. If he were improperly
arrested, he would have an action against
the officer for false arrest, but surely our
courts have not lost contact with reality
to the extent that we turn a guilty man
free simply "because the constable may
have blundered."

PETERSON v. CONTINEN
Cite as 4

From what has been said above, there
is absolutely no merit to this claim. By
being in control of an automobile while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
the defendant was guilty of a misdemeanor
which was in the presence of the officer,
and the officer had a right and a duty to
arrest him. 2
The defendant was found guilty in the
court below of being in actual physical
control of his truck while he was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. He
does not dispute that he was drunk. If the
statute is good, we should not attempt to
overrule the trier of the facts and find
that the defendant was not the one actually controlling his truck.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
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1. Insurance <&»452
Person on foot does not cease to be
"pedestrian" within policy covering injuries sustained while a pedestrian merely
because he is not in motion.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Insurance <§=»452
Where farmer was working about
idling farm tractor located on his private
property and it rolled forward and crushed
him, he was "pedestrian" within policy
covering injury "sustained in consequence
of being struck by any land conveyance
while a pedestrian."

Thomas S. Taylor, of Christensen, Taylor & Moody, Provo, for defendant-appellant.
Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen & Chamberlain,
Richfield, for plaintiff-respondent.

25 Utah 2d 408

H E N R I O D , Justice:

Irene A. PETERSON, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
C O N T I N E N T A L CASUALTY COMPANY, a

corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12187.

Supreme Court of Utah.
March 29, 1971.

Appeal by insurer from judgment of
the Sixth District Court, Sevier County,
Ferdinand Erickson, J., holding that deceased was covered by accident policy.
The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that
where farmer was working about idling
farm tractor located on his private property and it rolled forward and crushed him,
he was "pedestrian" within policy covering
injury "sustained in consequence of being
struck by any land conveyance while a pedestrian."
Affirmed.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Appeal from what was labeled a summary judgment for plaintiff which actually
was a judgment on all available facts, under, an insurance policy covering injury
"sustained in consequence of being struck
by any land conveyance while a pedestrian" Affirmed, with costs to plaintiff.
Believable evidence elicited under the
discovery process indicates that plaintiff's
farmer husband was crushed by a tractor
that, driverless, had rolled down a rise, all
of which occurred on his private property.
The only question is whether the deceased was a "pedestrian" under the terms
of the policy. The trial court said he was,
—a conclusion with which we agree,—no
one questioning the fact that the tractor
was a "land conveyance," and it appearing
that the vehicle, out of gear, simply traveled downhill as mentioned, and quite obviously ran over the deceased.
[1,2] Appellant indulges a non sequitur
by assuming that coverage under the policy

2. Sec. 77-13-3(1), U.C.A.1953.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Leslie G. KNOEFLER, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 14837.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 1, 1977.
Defendant was convicted before the
Sixth District Court, Garfield County, Don
V. Tibbs, J., of driving under the influence
of intoxicants and inflicting bodily injury
on another, and he appealed. The Supreme
Court, Wilkins, J., held that admission or a
confession without some independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti
cannot alone support a guilty verdict, that
connection of the accused with the crime
need not be proven to establish the corpus
delicti and that evidence, including evidence
that all three occupants of the automobile
were injured and that all three smelled of
alcohol, was sufficient to establish that the
crimes charged had occurred, independent
of defendant's admission of having driven
the automobile at time of the accident.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <s=>409(7), 535(1)
An admission or a confession, without
some independent corroborative evidence of
the corpus delicti, cannot alone support a
conviction of driving under the influence of
intoxicants and inflicting bodily injury on
another. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44(b, d).
2. Criminal Law <s=>563
To sustain a conviction, the requirement of independent proof of the corpus
delicti requires only that the State present
evidence that the injury specified in the
crime occurred, and that such injury was
caused by someone's criminal conduct.
3. Criminal Law to 409(5), 538(3), 563
An admission or a confession is admissible to connect an accused with the crime

committed; however, connection of the accused with the crime need not be proved to
establish the corpus delicti.
4. Automobiles <*=»332
Injuries resulting from an automobile
accident are those contemplated by crime of
driving under the influence of intoxicants
and inflicting bodily injury on another.
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44(b, d).
5. Criminal Law s=> 409(7)
Evidence that all three occupants of an
automobile were injured when it overturned, that they all smelled of alcohol, that
defendant and another were staggering and
their speech was slurred and that third individual was too seriously injured to be
moved, was sufficient evidence of corpus
delicti, independent of defendant's admission of having been the driver, so as to
support conviction of driving under the influence of intoxicants and inflicting bodily
injury on another; admission was corroborated by independent evidence that a crime
had occurred. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44(b, d).
James L. Shumate, Cedar City, for defendant and appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F.
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
David L. Mower, Garfield County Atty.,
Panguitch, for plaintiff and respondent.
WILKINS, Justice:
Defendant appeals from a conviction of
driving under the influence of intoxicants
and inflicting bodily injury on another in
violation of Utah Code Ann., Sec. 41-644(b) and (d), (1953). The facts reveal that
defendant and two other individuals, Stevens and Lund, were injured when an automobile in which they were riding overturned near Circleville, Utah, at approximately 6:15 a.m. on January 28, 1976. The
defendant and Lund escaped with minor
bruises and abrasions while Stevens was
seriously injured. The transcript disclosed
that there existed "an abundance of beer"
in the vicinity of the wreckage. Both defendant and Lund were staggering, slurring
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their speech, and both smelled of alcohol.
Witnesses to the accident also detected the
odor of alcohol on Stevens' breath, although
the serious nature of his injuries made it
impossible for him to move. While at the
scene of the accident, defendant admitted
to an investigating police officer that he
had been the driver of the automobile at
the time of the accident. He was then
placed under arrest and taken to Circleville
where a breathalyzer test was administered,
the results of which indicated his blood
alcohol content to be .21 percent by weight.
The defendant contends that ihe State at
the trial below failed to establish the corpus
delicti (i.e., that a crime had been committed) independently of his admission that he
was the driver of the automobile, and he
therefore seeks reversal of his conviction.
[1-3] An admission or a confession,
without some independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti, cannot alone
support a guilty verdict.1 To sustain a conviction, the requirement of independent
proof of the corpus delicti requires only
that the State present evidence that the
injury specified in the crime occurred, and
that such injury was caused by someone's
criminal conduct.2 An admission or confession is admissible to connect an accused
with the crime committed; but the connection of the accused with the crime need not
be proven to establish the corpus delicti.3

clearly disclosed that all three occupants of
the automobile were injured, one of them
quite seriously. Injuries resulting from an
automobile accident are those contemplated
by the crime herein involved.4 All three
occupants of the vehicle smelled of alcohol;
there was evidence of "an abundance of
beer" surrounding the wreckage; and the
defendant and Lund were staggering and
slurring their speech. One of the three
occupants had to be the driver, and with
evidence that all three had been drinking,
there was a showing that the injuries suffered were a result of someone's criminal
conduct of driving under the influence of
intoxicants.5 Consequently, the defendant's
conviction is not subject to reversal since
his admission was corroborated by independent evidence that a crime had occurred.
The effect of the defendant's admission was
to connect him to the crime, and his admission was not needed to establish that a
crime had been committed.
Affirmed.
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.

O I KEYNUMBERSVSTEM

[4,5] The State produced evidence of
the corpus delicti—that the crime of driving
under the influence of intoxicants and inflicting bodily injury on another had occurred—independent of the defendant's admission of having driven the automobile at
the time of the accident. The evidence
1. State v Envin, 101 Utah 365, 387, 120 P 2d
285 (1942), State v Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83
P 2d 1010 (1938); State v Jessup, 98 Utah 482,
487, 100 P.2d 969 (1970)
2. State v. Johnson, Id., 95 Utah at 580, 83 P 2d
1010. State v. Cazier, Utah, 521 P2d 554, 555
(1974). McCormick, Evidence (2nd. Ed. 1972)
Sec. 158, states' "To establish guilt, it is generally necessary for the prosecution to show that
(a) the injury of harm specified in the crime
occurred, (b) this injury or harm was caused bv
someone's criminal activity, and (c) the defendant was the guilty party. To sustain a convic-

tion, the requirement of independent proof of
the corpus delicti demands only that the prosecution have introduced independent evidence
tending to show (a) and (b) It is not necessary
that the independent proof tend to connect the
defendant with the crime "
3. Ibid.
4. Utah Code Ann, Sec 41-6-44(d), (1953)
5. Utah Code Ann., Sec. 41~6-44(b), (1953).
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Paul Brian TUCKER, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 19281.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 11, 1985.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F.
Wilkinson, J., of aggravated robbery, and
he appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) defendant's claim
that initial show-up identification was so
fraught with potential for misidentification
as to make resulting identification unreliable and inadmissible, which was not raised
at trial, would not be considered on appeal;
(2) even if prosecutor's remarks during
closing argument were an impermissible
comment on defendant's exercise of his
right to remain silent, any error did not
require reversal; and (3) defendant was not
entitled to cautionary jury instruction concerning reliability of witness testimony.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in result.
1. Criminal Law <S=>1036.1(7)
Supreme Court would not consider defendant's claim that initial show-up identification at place where defendant was apprehended made resulting identification
unreliable and its admission violative of
due process, absent any indication in record
that defense counsel raised such issue at
trial. Rules of Evid., Rules 4, 103(a); U.S.
C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
2. Criminal Law <s=>1036.1(7)
Defendant's contention that evidence
of his identification by victim at lineup held
one month after robbery should have been
excluded because lineup was tainted by
earlier suggestive showup was not raised
at trial, since defendant objected to such

evidence at trial only for lack of foundation, and thus, such ch'mf could not be
considered on appeal.
3. Criminal Law <S=>1030(1)
Under contemporaneous objection rule,
if trial court objection does not direct the
court's attention to legal point being raised
on appeal, the Supreme Court cannot consider such* point for first time on appeal.
4. Criminal Law <3=>723(3)
For statement by prosecutor to be an
unconstitutional comment on defendant's
exercise of his right not to take the stand,
remark must be manifestly intended or of
such character that jury would naturally
and necessarily construe it to amount to a
comment on failure of accused to testify.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
5. Criminal Law <£=>1165(1)
Conviction will not be reversed unless
error is something substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there would
have been a different result. U.C.A.1953,
77-35-30.
6. Criminal Law &*l 171.5
Even if prosecutor's remarks during
closing argument were an impermissible
comment on defendant's exercise of his
right to remain silent, any error did not
require reversal, since alleged misconduct
was not repetitive or intentional, evidence
of defendant's guilt was convincing, and
prompt objections prevented prosecutor
from making any real point of defendant's
failure to testify. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-30;
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5.
7. Criminal Law <3=>785(1)
Trial court's refusal to give cautionary
jury instruction concerning reliability of
eyewitness testimony was not error, since
jury was adequately instructed on elements
of offense, burden of proof, and its role in
assessing credibility of witnesses.
James C. Bradshaw, Frances Palacios,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
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David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Dave B.
Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert L.
Stott, Co. Atty, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
This is an appeal from a conviction of
aggravated robbery under U.C.A., 1953,
§ 76-6-302 (1978 ed.). Defendant challenges his conviction on grounds that he
was identified by the victim as a result of
an improperly suggestive showup and lineup, that the prosecutor's closing argument
constituted impermissible comment on his
failure to take the stand, and that the trial
court erred in refusing to give a cautionary
Telfaire-tyye instruction regarding the eyewitness identification of defendant. We reject these claims and affirm.
Early in the morning of February 18,
1983, two men were returning to their
rooms at the Little America Motel at 5th
South and Main Street in Salt Lake City,
when one of them heard a noise behind
them. While his companion continued
walking down the street, he turned around
and was confronted by a man pointing a
small handgun and wearing a bandana that
covered the lower part of his face. The
man demanded all of the victim's money.
He complied, handing over about $21, and
then watched as the robber quickly ran
down 5th South, where the victim glimpsed
a police car. The car, occupied by two Salt
Lake County sheriffs deputies, swerved to
avoid hitting the fleeing robber. Although
neither deputy had seen the robbery, they
both thought the man's conduct was suspicious. While one officer parked the car,
the other pursued the man on foot, losing
sight of him when he ran down a nearby
alley. At about the same time, a Salt Lake
City police department vice squad officer
happened by and joined in the pursuit. The
vice officer chased the man down the alley
and briefly lost sight of him, but continued
on in the same direction until he reached a
vacant lot. He scanned the lot with his
1. The instant case was tried before September 1,
1983, the effective date of the amended rules of
evidence. We therefore need not consider the
impact of the plain error exception in new Rule

flashlight and discovered defendant, who
ducked when the light struck him. The
vice officer drew his revolver, announced
that he was a police officer, and then detained defendant, who was dressed very
much like the man the officer had been
chasing. According to the vice officer, at
the time of apprehension defendant was
sweating profusely and had a rapid pulse.
The vice officer turned defendant over to
the Salt Lake County police officers. A
search of defendant produced a bandana
with a knot in it and about $21, while a
search of the area through which the chase
had taken place turned up a small handgun
matching the description given by the victim. The victim and his companion, who
had gone back to the motel after the robbery and summoned the police, were
brought to the area by the police. Both
men immediately identified defendant as
the man who had committed the robbery.
Approximately three weeks later, the victim again identified defendant as the robber by picking him from an eight-man lineup.
[1] Defendant's first contention is that
the initial showup in the vacant lot where
he was apprehended was conducted under
circumstances so fraught with potential for
misidentification as to make the resulting
identification unreliable and its admission
violative of due process. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-200, 93 S.Ct. 375,
381-83, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); State v.
McCumbtr, Utah, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (1980).
We do not reach this issue because there is
no indication in the record that defense
counsel ever raised it below. Under such
circumstances, we will not consider an objection raised for the first time on appeal.
See Rule 4, Utah R.Evid.; State v. McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945-47 (1982).1
[2] Defendant next argues that evidence of his identification by the victim at
the lineup held one month after the rob103(a) on the contemporaneous objection rule
incorporated in Rule 4 or on the -easomng of
McCardell.
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bery should have been excluded. Relying
on Neil v. Biggers, defendant contends that
the lineup was tainted by the earlier suggestive showup. Again, we must reject
defendant's claim because it was not raised
at trial.
[3] During the trial, defendant's counsel objected to the victim's testimony about
the lineup "for foundation" and requested
an off-the-record conference at the bench.
Because the request was granted, no
record exists as to the content of that objection. All the record reveals is that the
court subsequently overruled it. After the
jury was dismissed, defendant's counsel reiterated her objection on the record, stating
that "there was no foundation laid as to the
fairness and impartiality of that lineup in
terms of the people who were in the lineup
along with the defendant." On appeal, defendant's counsel does not contend that
there were any foundational problems with
the lineup. Instead, she alleges that the
Neil v. Biggers due process argument applies—that because of the defective showup, the lineup was fraught with potential
for misidentification. We have no record,
however, of this objection being made below and must conclude, therefore, that the
trial court's attention was never called to
it. Under the contemporaneous objection
rule, if the trial court objection does not
"direct the court's attention" to the legal
point being raised on appeal, we cannot
consider it for the first time on appeal.
652 P.2d at 947.
[4] The third claim is that the prosecutor's closing argument constituted impermissible comment on defendant's exercise
of his fifth amendment right not to take
the stand. For a statement by a prosecutor to be constitutional error his remark
must be " 'manifestly intended or . . . of
such character that a jury would naturally
and necessarily construe it to amount to a
comment on the failure of the accused to
testify.'" State IK Nomeland, Utah, 581
P.2d 1010, 1011 (1978), quoting State v.
Jefferson, 116 R.I. 124, 137, 353 A.2d 190,
198 (1976); accord, State v. Hales, Utah,
652 P.2d 1290, 1291-92 (1982). In the

present case, we do not find that constitutional error of reversible dimension occurred. During closing argument, the following colloquy took place:
Mr. Stott (prosecutor): She tells you that
the reason the defendant was sweating,
[sic] because a gun was pointed at him.
She doesn't tell us why he was in the
field hiding, does she?
Ms. Carter (defender): Your Honor, I am
going to object to that.
Mr. Stott: Also—
Ms. Carter: The defense has no burden
to put on any evidence of anything.
Mr. Stott: I didn't say what the defense
was. I said she didn't say—
The Court: Counsel, let's complete this
case. Let me make the statement, of
course, that the burden is on the State to
prove the case. The defendant does not
have a burden of proving his innocence.
Mr. Stott: Thank you. She didn't tell
you, did she, why he was on that—
Ms. Carter: Your Honor, I am going to
object.
The Court: Counsel, I would again admonish the jury and admonish you also
that the State, the defendant does not
have the responsibility of proving his innocence. The burden is on the State to
prove the guilt.
At this point, the prosecutor continued with
his summation, but made no further reference to the failure of defense counsel to
explain defendant's actions.
This exchange does not appear to display
an intention by the prosecutor to comment
on the failure of defendant to take the
stand. Rather, we think that the prosecutor simply was careless in choosing his
words. He appears not to have even realized that his remarks could be construed as
a comment on defendant's failure to testify, since he persisted without apparent
guile after the judge first admonished the
jury that defendant had no burden to carry.
But even assuming that the remarks did, in
fact, constitute impermissible comment and
that the jury so understood them, we do
not find that the error requires reversal.
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[5,6] Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that 4<[a]riy error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a
party shall be disregarded." U.C.A., 1953,
§ 77-35-30 (1982 ed.). We will not reverse
a conviction unless the error " 'is something substantial and prejudicial in the
sense that there is a reasonable likelihood
that in its absence there would have been a
different result/ " State v. Hutchinson,
Utah, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (1982), quoting
State v. Unas, Utah, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329
(1980); accord State v. Fontana, Utah, 680
P.2d 1042, 1048 (1984). Considering all of
the circumstances, there was no reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been
different had the prosecutor not made the
improper comments. This is not a case
where the prosecutorial misconduct was repetitive or intentional, as in State v. Wiswell, Utah, 639 P.2d 146 (1981). Nor is it
one where the evidence of guilt was marginal. All the eyewitness identifications
were certain and unwaivering, and the circumstantial evidence was convincing. Finally, defense counsel's prompt objections
prevented the prosecutor from making any
real point of the failure to testify, and the
trial judge's quick and decisive admonition
to the jury and prosecutor further obviated
any harm that mi^ht have resulted from
the comments. See State v. Kazda, Utah,
540 P.2d 949, 952-53 (1975) (Maughan, J.,
concurring).
[7] The final claim is that the trial court
erred in refusing to give a cautionary jury
instruction concerning the reliability of the
eyewitness testimony. The proposed instruction closely followed that recommended in United States v. Telfaire, 469
F.2d 552 (D.C.Cir.1972). We have recognized that under suitable circumstances a
cautionary instruction of the type requested would be required. However, the question of whether such an instruction is required in a particular case has been left to
the discretion of the trial courts. State v.
Reedy, Utah, 681 P.2d 1251, 1252 (1984);
State v. Newton, Utah, 681 P.2d 833, 834
(1984); State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d
56, 61-62 (1982); State v. Schaffer, Utah,

638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (1981). Considering
the factors discussed in State v. Reedy,
supra, at 1254, we conclude that the refusal to give such an instruction here was not
error. We also note that in accordance
with State v. Schaffer, the trial court adequately instructed the jury on the elements
of the offense, the prosecution's burden of
proof, and the jury's role in assessing the
credibility of the witnesses.
The conviction is affirmed.
HALL, C.J., and HOWE and DURHAM,
JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result
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Defendants were convicted in the Second District Court, Weber County, David
E, Roth, J., of possession with intent to
distribute and production of a controlled
substance, and they appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1)
evidence was sufficient to support first defendant's convictions for production of controlled substance and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; evidence
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